South Carolina Business Law Blog

Hello FAA, My Old Friend South Carolina courts have frequently been called upon to consider the ways in which the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to those contracts containing clauses purporting to require arbitration. The recent S.C Court of Appeals decision Grant v. Kuhn Chevrolet is the latest example. The opinion and its result rests not on the application of South Carolina statutory or case law, but instead a line of United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) cases applying the FAA to disputes over agreements to arbitrate. For some background and discussion on some of these cases, click  here , here , or here . While it may not be entirely remarkable to apply SCOTUS opinions in state court cases, the manner of contract interpretation mandated by SCOTUS for arbitration agreements is completely different than the way South Carolina courts interpret “everyday” contracts. More specifically, these SCOTUS opinions explicitly prohibit the use of several contract interpretation t

But Bazzle Keeps Coming Back Up .... Introduction: Class Arbitration Castles Burning ....     Years ago this platform discussed at some length how more than one United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) decision has considered the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle : in the context of who decides issues of arbitrability, as well as whether arbitration agreements allow classwide arbitration. (For that background, click here . For a broader survey of arbitration and class actions in the context of SCOTUS and South Carolina-- at least at that point in time-- click here ). SCOTUS recently took up the issue of class arbitration again, ruling in Lamps Plus that an ambiguous contract to arbitrate could not authorize class arbitration. Lamps Plus extended the rationale of  Stolt-Nielsen , a 2010 SCOTUS decision concluding that an agreement that is "silent" on the question of class arbitration could not compel the parties to classwide arbitration. As

Introduction In 2010, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds (" Stolt-Nielsen ") vacated an arbitration panel's decision to require class arbitration, because the contract between the parties provided no basis to conclude those parties agreed to submit themselves (and their disputes) to class arbitration. The decision sparked more than a little discussion about the continued viability of class arbitration.  (For this blog's 2010 take on Stolt-Nielsen , click here ).  After all, how many arbitration clauses have you seen with language like "The parties agree that the arbitrator shall have the authority to conduct class arbitration"? On June 10th, Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter ( Oxford ) revisited the issue of whether an arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration, and upheld an arbitrator's decision to conduct class arbitration. As is often the case with U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, those issues

Third in a series of posts discussing the United States Supreme Court's decisions addressing arbitration, in the context of existing South Carolina case law and particularly the South Carolina Supreme Court's Herron decision. Previous posts are here and here . The Herron Result The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the prohibition against class actions found in the parties' arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it conflicted with clear language in the Dealers Act allowing class actions. Because the arbitration agreement contained a severability clause ("[i]f any part of this Agreement shall be deemed or found unenforceable for any reason, the remainder of the Agreement shall remain enforceable"), the class action prohibition would be stricken from the agreement and the case could go forward in arbitration. However, the S.C. Supreme Court declined to compel the matter to arbitration, based upon a statement by counsel for Century at o