Posts

Collateral for Finality: U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Law in the 4th Circuit for Time to Appeal

On January 15, 2014 in Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund , the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a pending claim for attorney's fees based upon a statute, contract, or both, does not prevent a final judgment on the merits for purposes of appeal.  Haluch overrules the 4th Circuit opinion Carolina Power and Light v. Dynegy Marketing . Background 28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives federal courts of appeal jurisdiction from "final decisions" of district courts.  Typically, a decision on the merits is a "final decision" even if the attorney's fees remain to be determined.  Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.   In the 4th Circuit prior to Haluch , the rule in Carolina Power and Light distinguished Budinich by providing that "a district court decision that leaves unresolved a claim for attorneys fees that are sought as an element of damages under the substantive law is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291."  Broad brush...

U.S. Supreme Court Rejects CAFA "Mass Action" Removal (as the 4th Circuit and Judge Anderson did)

Image
Per the United States Supreme Court's unanimous ruling in Mississippi v. AU Optronics Corp. (issued on January 14, 2014), a state's lawsuit seeking restitution for the benefit of its citizens does not meet the definition of a "mass action" under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and cannot be removed to federal court. Background   CAFA defines "mass action" as "any civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact."  28 U.S.C Section 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). This case reached the Supreme Court following the 5th Circuit's determination that Mississippi's lawsuit against AU Optronics qualified as a "mass action" under CAFA.  According to the 5th Circuit, even though the State of Mississippi was the only "named plaintiff," the "real parties in interest" w...

Oxford Health Plans: More from the U.S. Supreme Court on the "Silence" in Arbitration Agreements

Introduction In 2010, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds (" Stolt-Nielsen ") vacated an arbitration panel's decision to require class arbitration, because the contract between the parties provided no basis to conclude those parties agreed to submit themselves (and their disputes) to class arbitration. The decision sparked more than a little discussion about the continued viability of class arbitration.  (For this blog's 2010 take on Stolt-Nielsen , click here ).  After all, how many arbitration clauses have you seen with language like "The parties agree that the arbitrator shall have the authority to conduct class arbitration"? On June 10th, Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter ( Oxford ) revisited the issue of whether an arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration, and upheld an arbitrator's decision to conduct class arbitration. As is often the case with U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, those issues ...

The Only Thing Settled About Arbitrability is its Continued Litigatibility

Introduction Although both the United States Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court often attempt to define arbitrability -- the question of whether a contractual provision purporting to send disputes to arbitration is enforceable --  the case-by-case analysis applied in considering it means that like the Lernaean Hydra , a determination on one set of facts will only spawn numerous other challenges.   The South Carolina Court of Appeals' recent decision in Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., et al. is the latest in this line of arbitrability cases, affirming a circuit court determination that an arbitration clause in a purchase agreement was unenforceable because it was unconscionable.  For this Blog's previous posts chronicling arbitrability decisions and related topics, see  Recent Cases on the Reach of the S.C. and Federal Arbitration Acts , Asserting the Right to Compel Arbitration , Arbitrating Arbitrability: Part One of the Effect of Recent ...

4th Circuit Issues Two Standing Opinions On the Same Day

Introduction Attorneys and judges burn a great deal of time and energy debating and determining the issue of "standing": broad brush whether there is a "case or controversy" sufficient to invoke the power of a court to hear it. The wildly different factual scenarios in those cases applying standing requirements (compare Sea Pines v. SCDNR with Smiley v. SCDHEC ) sometimes make it difficult to square how and why standing exists in one case, but not in another. On April 5th, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals issued a pair of opinions,  Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Association, Inc. v. OpenBand at Lansdowne, LLC and Southern Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Association, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC , applying the constitutional standing test to two very similar fact patterns and reaching different conclusions.  Comparing the analyses in the two cases may be helpful to practitioners. It is absolutely untrue that I decided to blog on this topic bec...

Some Uses Just Don't Belong: Land Use Law and "Caddyshack"

Image
Introduction The South Carolina Supreme Court recently issued Dunes West Golf Club v. Town of Mt. Pleasant .  Justice Kittredge , writing for a unanimous court, (and in an opinion footnoted as heavily as a David Foster Wallace  essay) affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Town of Mt. Pleasant (Town).   Dunes West Golf Club (Dunes West) had challenged both a zoning change that prevented residential development on all golf courses in Mount Pleasant, as well as the Town's subsequent denial of Dunes West's request to rezone its golf course property in order to allow residential development. Of course I, like other arrested adolescents of my vintage, can't even see or hear the word "golf", much less read an opinion about zoning and land use in and around golf courses, without conjuring up characters, images and quotes from the 1980 movie Caddyshack , and the friendly environs of the Bushwood Country Club. (This affectation has threatened to...

Proposed Regulation Would Make Mediation Mandatory In Certain S.C. Workers' Compensation Cases

Image
By Lana Sims The South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission has submitted to the General Assembly for approval a proposed regulation requiring parties to mediate certain claims.    As set out in the Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Rules first adopted in 2006 by the South Carolina Supreme Court, (and making mediation mandatory in certain civil trial and family courts), mediation is defined as:  An informal process in which a third-party mediator facilitates settlement discussions between parties.   Any settlement is voluntary.   In the absence of settlement, the parties lose none of their rights to trial. For several years, parties with disputes pending at the Workers’ Compensation Commission have been encouraged to mediate their cases before going to a hearing.   However, under Proposed Regulation 67-1801, which can be found here , parties must mediate the following claims prior to a hearing: claims ...